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Purpose:
The purpose of this paper is to assess the impact of public services and 
corporations’ corruption risk management plans on international perceptions of 
corruption in Portugal and on the detection and court conviction of corruption 
behaviours.
Design/Methods/Approach:
This research assumed that political systems, institutions and social groups, 
and the variety of forms in which individuals interact with them play a major 
role in corruption behaviours. Corruption risk management plans have formed 
part of the Portuguese anti-corruption strategy since 2009 and their design and 
implementation has been politically and socially contextualised. Official data 
on corruption provided by governmental and non-governmental agencies and 
covering the period between 2001 and 2014 were used to identify corruption 
trends before and after implementation of the plans.
Findings:
Existing data suggest that, at least until 2014, the corruption risk management 
plans had no impact on international perceptions of corruption in Portugal, or on 
the detection and court conviction of corruption cases.
Research Limitations/Implications:
The outcome of a single anti-corruption measure, such as the plans, is difficult 
to identify and isolate since several other measures are activated or remain active 
during the same time period, as do several social, political, economic or cultural 
factors. This first and preliminary assessment will have to be followed by a more 
in-depth, qualitative analysis.
Originality/Value: 
This paper highlights the need to assess the outcomes of every 
anti-corruption measure. The corruption risk management plans are a time- and 
resource-consuming measure that must be further tested with regard to its social 
and political benefits.
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Razvoj in vpliv protikorupcijske politike na Portugalskem: 
preliminarna ocena načrtov za obvladovanje tveganja 
korupcije
Namen prispevka: 
Namen prispevka je oceniti vpliv načrtov za obvladovanje tveganja korupcije, 
ki jih uporabljajo v javni upravi in korporacijah, na mednarodno dojemanje 
korupcije na Portugalskem ter na odkrivanje in obsodbe koruptivnega vedenja. 
Metode: 
Pričujoča raziskava predpostavlja, da igrajo politični sistemi, institucije in 
družbene skupine ter različni načini posameznikove interakcije z njimi pomembno 
vlogo pri pojavu koruptivnega vedenja. Načrti za obvladovanje tveganja korupcije 
so od leta 2009 del portugalske protikorupcijske strategije. Njihovo oblikovanje 
in izvedba sta bila tako politično kot tudi družbeno kontekstualizirana. Za 
ugotavljanje trendov korupcije pred in po izvedbi načrtov smo uporabili uradne 
podatke vladnih in nevladnih agencij o korupciji med letoma 2001 in 2014.
Ugotovitve: 
Obstoječi podatki kažejo, da vsaj do leta 2014 načrti za obvladovanje tveganja 
korupcije niso imeli nobenega vpliva na mednarodno dojemanje korupcije na 
Portugalskem ter na odkrivanje in obsodbe primerov korupcije.
Omejitve/uporabnost raziskave: 
Izide enega ukrepa za boj proti korupciji, kot so načrti, je težko prepoznati in 
izolirati, saj so v istem časovnem obdobju potekali ali bili aktivirani številni drugi 
ukrepi, prav tako pa številni socialni, politični, gospodarski in kulturni dejavniki. 
Prvi in preliminarni oceni bodo morale slediti bolj poglobljene, kvalitativne 
analize.
Izvirnost/pomembnost prispevka: 
Ta članek poudarja potrebo po ocenjevanju rezultatov vseh protikorupcijskih 
ukrepov. Načrti za obvladovanje tveganja korupcije so dolgotrajni ukrep, ki 
potrebuje tudi določena sredstva in vire, zato jih je treba še dodatno preskusiti 
glede na socialne in politične koristi.
UDK: 343.352
Ključne besede: korupcija, načrti za obvladovanje tveganja korupcije, 
preprečevanje kriminalitete
1 INTRODUCTION
Corruption reduces economic and social efficiency and results in distortions. 
Generally speaking, corruption causes harm. It damages the potential for sustained 
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growth or other aspects of the economy and society, even when corruption 
seems to be a more efficient way of bypassing abusive government regulations, 
or to bring about other benefits. As Klitgaard (1988) clearly stated a long time 
ago, the harmful effects of corruption greatly outweigh its (occasional) social or 
economic benefits and, although the effects of corruption are still disputed, it can 
be generally assumed that corruption has a deleterious, often devastating effect 
on governance and on economic and political development.
Corruption behaviours are linked to a wide array of political, social, economic 
and cultural factors. One single factor is usually not sufficient or necessary to 
explain or predict corruption. Limited or occasional corruption behaviours 
can be explained by individual factors, ranging from persistent or occasional 
financial strain to revenge or long-term general unlawful rent-seeking behaviour. 
However, more or less widespread corruption behaviours can be better explained 
by complex social structures and networks that in an organised manner and 
systematically drive individuals, or allow them to be driven into corruption 
(Scott, 1972). Different political systems facilitate different types, levels and effects 
of corruption in each system, so corruption “must be understood as a regular, 
repetitive, integral part of the operation of most political systems” (Scott, 1972: 
26).
Political systems, institutions and social groups, and the variety of forms in 
which individuals interact with them, play a major role in corruption behaviours. 
The abuse of public and public-related office for individual or group gain is 
unethical or criminal individual behaviour only in as far as it cannot be linked 
to societies that are structured according to specific social groups’ interactions – 
either cooperative or conflicting – and interests. In such a case, corruption should 
be regarded as a social phenomenon going beyond the sum of individual unlawful 
rent-seeking behaviours.
Democratic systems, like the one existing today in Portugal, tend to be 
relatively well equipped to prevent all forms of corruption. The election systems 
allow for almost universal participation at national and regional political levels. 
Barriers to the political participation of the vast majority of the population are 
virtually non-existent and the democratic political system can handle almost all 
demands being made on it, regardless of their scale and nature. Through regular 
elections voters can hold politicians and public officeholders accountable and 
citizens, who feel disenfranchised from formal political power and are potentially 
drawn to corruption as an informal way of influencing it, are generally a minority 
(Lambsdorff, 2006).
The rule of democratic law is in force and regular checks and balances of 
political institutions and actors, as well as of public and public-related office 
holders, are done by specialised and stable auditing and judicial institutions. 
The capture of political power and of government by national elites, trying to 
violate existing rules against the exercise of certain types of private-related 
influence and aim at private-related (personal, close or enlarged family, interest 
group) pecuniary or status gains, is not impossible but reasonably prevented 
by institutionalised accountability or, as a last resource, by whistle-blowing 
processes that are assured by a fairly extensive and protected freedom of writing 
and speech.
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Democratic countries, like Portugal, are nevertheless still affected by 
corruption, be it in the form of bribery, kickbacks, extortion, ‘speed money’, 
collusion, fraud and an immense variety of other actions of individuals, groups 
or corporations, in both the public and private sectors, aiming to influence the 
formation of laws, regulations, decrees and other government policies to their 
own advantage.
Several factors have been found to be linked to a higher prevalence of corruption 
in democratic regimes: low governance transparency and accountability, usually 
associated to a recent or unstable democratic regime; high government control 
of the economy and of society in general; complex and difficult-to-understand 
administrative and business regulations; complex and low-scale progressive 
taxation systems; low payment levels of public or public-related officials; 
socio-political and cultural leniency towards unlawful rent-seeking strategies, 
compensating for the underpayment of officials; or high income inequalities 
(Gupta, Verhoeven, & Tiongson, 2002; Lambsdorff, 2006; Lambsdorff & Cornelius, 
2000; Wittemyer, Bailur, Anand, Park, & Gigler, 2014).
2 CORRUPTION IN PORTUGAL – A BRIEF EXCURSION INTO THE 
RECENT PAST
Portugal has a relatively recent democratic regime. During the former regime 
(lasting from 1928 to 1974), political power was almost entirely centralised in 
a single person (Rosas, 2012). The effectiveness and continuity of this power 
centralisation was assured by all available means, going from persuasive mass 
propaganda to strict obedience based in widespread physical and psychological 
repression. The former regime was clearly authoritarian in nature, following the 
definition mentioned by Linz (2000).
The regime rested on emergency decrees that were enforced through violence 
or the threat of violence in the first stage, but was later disguised under the cover of 
apparently democratic constitution and laws that assured that government rested 
on the people. Elections were held regularly, but everything was set to ensure 
that only candidates loyal to the regime were elected. The rule of democratic law 
seemed to be in force, although law enforcement agencies and courts were in fact 
forced to primarily engage in the incrimination of political dissidents – as well as 
to be lenient on criminals loyal or instrumental to the regime. Freedom of speech 
and assembly, as well as freedom of the press, were also formally legally granted, 
although fierce censorship was in fact brutally imposed or even self-imposed 
due to the fear of consequences. Overall, the level of protection of fundamental 
individual human rights, as they were internationally agreed upon since 1948, 
was very low or simply non-existent.
The former Portuguese regime can be described as autocratic benevolent 
in the sense such regimes are described, for example, by Dixit (2006). Instead of 
fiercely controlling and exploiting all resources for the sole benefit of one person 
or family, as usually happens in predatory autocracies, the regime shared the 
available resources with a limited number of elite families and distributed the 
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remains in order to provide for the most basic needs of the majority of citizens. 
However, this was only done to the extent needed to ensure the power monopoly 
was not seriously challenged.
Despite this benevolent characteristic, political decision processes were 
inherently non-transparent. They were not intended for and did not allow public 
discussion on the criteria used or on the objectives or expected outcomes of each 
decision. Who benefited from a given decision was a sort of open secret that was 
neither supposed to be publically discussed nor challenged, only very carefully 
gossiped about. Political dissidents and the mass media were not supposed to 
question any type of political decision and inevitably they became brutally 
obliged or self-imposed non-reliable or non-trusted whistle-blowers. Political 
accountability was simply not needed.
Resembling what was described, for example, by Gerring and Thacker (2004) 
or by Aidt, Dutta, and Sena (2007), how to counter-resist or avoid the regime’s 
abusive interference in business and everyday life became part of a socialisation 
process crucial for the majority of Portuguese citizens – and it seems to have had 
long-lasting effects. A widespread and deeply-rooted belief slowly developed 
that corruptly engaging with the ruling autocratic rulers and public officers, or 
exchanging favours with them, were the most successful tools for avoiding the 
abusive governance norms or rules, or for getting something from the autocratic 
government. Well-placed relatives or friends in the regime political or economic 
structure became valuable assets and the exchange of personal favours a social 
norm and rule. For regime outsiders, the chances of getting some share of the 
available resources depended on being or not being able to pay disproportionally 
for it – and paying to avoid regulations in practice, not theoretically, is what 
corruption is about in a broad sense. Governance was not expected to make sure 
that all citizens had similar competing opportunities – and certainly not to take 
the values or needs of those with little or no power or opposed the regime into 
much consideration. Although theoretically protected by constitutional or other 
types of laws, women or religious, ethnic, national or gender minorities were, for 
example and in practice, prevented from entering competing processes aiming at 
sharing the most valuable resources.
The shadow economy flourished in order to counter the abusive, 
privilege-oriented, administrative business regulations, as did tax evasion 
or fraud, simply because regulations and taxation were not perceived to be 
instruments intended to benefit the majority. Senior, middle and low public 
officers slowly learned that everything could be tailored according to the regime’s 
most powerful players’ needs and interests, especially laws and norms and rules 
of conduct. Transferring these learning outcomes to relations with other less 
powerful players was only a matter of time. Political and public service ethics 
slowly became a synonym for ‘whatever serves a mutual interest and does not 
challenge the regime is right’.
Although it is still difficult to assert objectively on account of the existing 
brutal censorship (Madeira, Pimentel, & Farinha, 2007) and the lack of official 
data, corruption and trafficking in influence on all political and public service 
levels and ranks seem to have flourished and been generally tolerated at the 
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top as the price for having blind-eye loyalty. The questioning of the abusive 
privileges held by the regime´s elites was simply avoided by rewarding the most 
loyal bottom-supporters with a shadow income arising from holding offices with 
greater corruption opportunities – most likely in customs, public procurement, 
public corporations or the police. The cost of this strategy was negligible, as 
explained by Wintrobe (1998) and Besley and McLaren (1993) since the shadow 
income was paid by the end-users as some sort of shadow tax.
Similarly to other cases described by Darden (2008), Sun (2001, 2004) or 
Urban (1985), corruption or trafficking in influence was normally dealt with by 
caution by law enforcement agencies, especially when they involved top players 
of the ruling elites. Occasional harsh   sentences were applied just to show that 
corruption and political dissidence should both be seen as morally unacceptable. 
But it goes almost without saying that whistle-blowing by the mass media, 
political or public officer dissidents or ordinary citizens was not encouraged at all 
and could have very unpleasant consequences whenever the accused party was 
an extremely loyal regime-politician or public office holder.
3 ANTI-CORRUPTION STRATEGIES AND FRAMEWORKS IN 
DEMOCRATIC PORTUGAL
By April 1974, when the autocratic regime had been overthrown by a coup-d’état, 
Portugal ranked high in almost all factors usually associated with a higher 
prevalence of corruption. Soon after the coup-d’état, government control of the 
economy even increased substantially following an extensive nationalisation 
process. However, the ensuing democratic regime stabilised by Portugal joining 
the European Union in 1986 brought substantial social and economic development. 
Salaries and labour rights increased, as did the overall living conditions. Income 
inequalities diminished; payment levels of public or public-related officials 
increased; new and more transparent and progressive taxation systems were 
implemented, as were less complex and more transparent administrative and 
business regulations. Starting from the last decade of the 20th century and still 
ongoing, further reprivatisation processes were carried out and government 
weight on the economy decreased (Barreto, 2002).
Governance transparency and accountability increased, notably through 
extensive administrative reforms and the implementation of e-governance 
processes. Since 2006, an extensive reform of central government has been 
designed and implemented, aiming at the modernisation and rationalisation 
of services and at the increased transparency, accountability and quality of the 
services rendered to citizens, corporations and communities (Council of Ministers 
Resolution no. 124 of 2005, 2005).
Almost all Portuguese democratic governments have committed themselves 
to the fight against corruption. Almost all have pursued legislative and institutional 
anti-corruption measures and some have even created anti-corruption specialised 
agencies. Amendments to penal legislation, party-funding laws, the recruitment 
system for senior and middle-management levels in public administration, 
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auditing procedures, banking supervision and accountability standards within 
the public administration and state-owned corporations happened in the last 
decades of the 20th century (Ferreira & Baptista, 1993).
Despite all the social and economic developments and political commitments 
and practical efforts to curb corruption, with the latter involving the invaluable 
assistance of the Council of Europe Group of States against Corruption, by the end 
of the 20th century Portugal was still scoring below most European Union member 
states in Transparency International’s Corruption Perceptions Index (Table 1). 
Only Italy and Greece were perceived as even more ‘corrupt’ than Portugal. It 
seemed that the deeply embedded values and behaviours that had flourished 
during the autocratic regime simply did not vanish overnight with democracy.
2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 Average
Greece 4.2 4.2 4.3 4.3 4.3 4.4 4.6 4.7 3.8 3.5 3.4 3.6 4.0 4.3 4.1
Italy 5.5 5.2 5.3 4.8 5.0 4.9 5.2 4.8 4.3 3.9 3.9 4.2 4.3 4.3 4.7
Portugal 6.3 6.3 6.6 6.3 6.5 6.6 6.5 6.1 5.8 6.0 6.1 6.3 6.2 6.3 6.3
Spain 7.0 7.1 6.9 7.1 7.0 6.8 6.7 6.5 6.1 6.1 6.2 6.5 5.9 6.0 6.6
France 6.7 6.3 6.9 7.1 7.5 7.4 7.3 6.9 6.9 6.8 7.0 7.1 7.1 6.9 7.0
Belgium 6.6 7.1 7.6 7.5 7.4 7.3 7.1 7.3 7.1 7.1 7.5 7.5 7.5 7.6 7.3
Ireland 7.5 6.9 7.5 7.5 7.4 7.4 7.5 7.7 8.0 8.0 7.5 6.9 7.2 7.4 7.5
Germany 7.4 7.3 7.7 8.2 8.2 8.0 7.8 7.9 8.0 7.9 8.0 7.9 7.8 7.9 7.9
Austria 7.8 7.8 8.0 8.4 8.7 8.6 8.1 8.1 7.9 7.9 7.8 6.9 6.9 7.2 7.9
UK 8.3 8.7 8.7 8.6 8.6 8.6 8.4 7.7 7.7 7.6 7.8 7.4 7.6 7.8 8.1
Luxembourg 8.7 9.0 8.7 8.4 8.5 8.6 8.4 8.3 8.2 8.5 8.5 8.0 8.0 8.2 8.4
Netherlands 8.8 9.0 8.9 8.7 8.6 8.7 9.0 8.9 8.9 8.8 8.9 8.4 8.3 8.3 8.7
Sweden 9.0 9.3 9.3 9.2 9.2 9.2 9.3 9.3 9.2 9.2 9.3 8.8 8.9 8.7 9.1
Finland 9.9 9.7 9.7 9.7 9.6 9.6 9.4 9.0 8.9 9.2 9.4 9.0 8.9 8.9 9.4
Denmark 9.5 9.5 9.5 9.5 9.5 9.5 9.4 9.3 9.3 9.3 9.4 9.0 9.1 9.2 9.4
The anti-corruption political commitments and implementation of practical 
anti-corruption measures continued during the first decade of the 21st century 
and, in 2006, the gap between the Portuguese Perceptions of Corruption Index 
scores and the average scores for the European Union had clearly diminished. 
However, the Portuguese scores deteriorated after 2006 and, in 2008 following 
growing suspicions of increasing corruption behaviours, the Council for the 
Prevention of Corruption (CPC) was set up within the Portuguese Court of 
Auditors and tasked with coordinating and analysing prevention policies (Law 
no. 54 of 2008). The following year, the Council recommended that all central 
and local public services, including state-owned or controlled corporations, 
should prepare and implement plans for managing the risks of corruption and 
related-offences (Conselho de Prevenção da Corrupção, 2009).
The management plans started being implemented and, at almost at the 
same time, in 2010, the Portuguese National Assembly (Parliament) adopted a 
Table 1: 
Transparency 
International’s 
Corruption 
Perception 
Index (inverted 
score: 0 – high 
corruption; 10 –
low corruption) 
(Source: 
Transparency 
International 
Corruption 
Perceptions 
Index, 
2001–2014)
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new anti-corruption legislative package, including adding the violation of urban 
planning rules as a new type of crime, an extension of prison prescription terms 
for corruption offences, the setting up of a central register of bank accounts and a 
new amendment to the law on funding political parties (Laws no. 26, no. 32 and 
no. 55 of 2010).
An assessment made in 2013 by the Council of Europe Group of States 
against Corruption (GRECO, 2013) singled Portugal out for having satisfactorily 
implemented or dealt with six of thirteen previous recommendations on 
incriminations and party funding. The assessment also noted that six other 
recommendations had been partly implemented and only one had not been 
implemented.
New amendments to the penal code were adopted in early 2013, including 
greater sanctions for offences committed by holders of political office or senior 
public officials (Law no. 4 of 2013). Changes in the penal sanctions for corruption 
offences in the private sector, for trafficking in influence and for offences by foreign 
officials were implemented according to the GRECO recommendations. Finally, 
specialised units from the national prosecutor’s office (the Central Department 
of Investigation and Penal Action) and the national judiciary police (the National 
Unit for Combating Corruption) were designated to investigate corruption cases 
(European Commission, 2014).
It is also worth mentioning that in May 2011, following the 2008 global 
financial crisis and the subsequent European sovereign debt crisis, Portugal 
started to be financially assisted by the ‘troika’ (European Central Bank, European 
Commission and International Monetary Fund). Officials from the ‘troika’ started 
closely monitoring the Portuguese national, regional and local governments’ 
management strategies and instruments, as well as any mismanagement practices, 
including those possibly involving corruption. 
3.1 Corruption risk management plans
The Council for the Prevention of Corruption (CPC), set up within the National 
Court of Auditors in 2008, was tasked with the coordination and analysis of 
prevention policies. As mentioned, in 2009 the Council recommended that all 
central, regional and local public services, including state-owned or controlled 
corporations, should prepare plans for the management of the risks of corruption 
and related offences.
The recommendation stated that the top-level management of each public 
service or corporation should draw up an internal plan taking into consideration: 
a) the existing corruption risk in each department, unit, sector or function; 
b) measures to prevent or counteract the identified risk, like internal control 
mechanisms or processes, separation of functions and tasks, prior criteria to 
be applied, for example, to the concession of public benefits, the recruitment 
of external experts, the nomination of juries, or appropriate training; c) the 
nomination of those in charge of implementing the plan. An annual report on the 
plan’s implementation and main outcomes was also recommended to be sent to the 
Council for the Prevention of Corruption and to all applicable supervision, control 
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and auditing services or agencies. For the sensitive areas of public procurement 
and the concession of public benefits, the use of special guidelines and checklists, 
made available by the Portuguese Court of Auditors, was also recommended.
Supervision, control and auditing services or agencies were recommended 
to verify the existence and implementation of the plans and the Council for 
the Prevention of Corruption tasked itself with randomly visiting the different 
services and corporations in order to assess the existence of a management plan. It 
has to be noted, however, that the CPC was not granted verification or sanctioning 
powers concerning, for example, the degree of implementation of a plan.
Overall, the plans were intended as an internal tool for each public service 
or corporation to identify risks, to ensure greater internal and external awareness 
of such risks and their prevention and, whenever possible, for the early detection 
of possible corruption schemes and behaviours, leading to more successful 
investigations, prosecutions and proceedings. A typical plan includes a brief 
characterisation of the service or institution: the main mission, values, internal 
structure and available human, financial and logistic resources; the existing current 
management plans and instruments; a corruption risk diagnosis describing the 
core identified risk areas and factors and the functions and responsibilities of 
the different internal officials in charge of the plan; a description of the designed 
and to be implemented prevention measures; and a description of the designed 
monitoring, evaluation and updating processes and instruments.
By the end of 2013, 643 Portuguese public institutions and services, employing 
around 400,000 civil servants (roughly 70% of the total employed by central, 
regional and local governments) had implemented corruption risk management 
plans. The majority of these plans were available on each institution’s or service’s 
website for the sake of public consultation and internal awareness. Most plans 
were designed by middle and senior management staff and officially approved at 
the highest level. However, the quality and extensiveness of the risk assessments 
and corresponding prevention measures were uneven, as recognised by at least 
half the Portuguese public services that implemented the plans (Conselho de 
Prevenção da Corrupção, 2014).
4 THE MEANINGS AND METRICS OF CORRUPTION
The meanings of corruption and the behaviours embraced by its definition are 
constantly changing. The most common understanding of corruption today, 
as defined by the World Bank in 1997, is that it constitutes an “abuse of public 
office for private gain” (Johnston, 2005). Such abuse can assume several forms: 
speeding up or omitting steps or requirements in a governmental licence or 
permit process, in accessing a public sector service or good or in another type 
of governance decision-making process; setting up public procurements for 
unnecessary or useless goods or services; tailor-made specifications; collusive 
bidding; unclear selection or evaluation criteria; abuse of negotiated procedures; 
abuse of emergency grounds and amending contract terms after concluding a 
contract in public procurements; or the actions of individuals, groups or firms in 
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both the public and private sectors aimed at influencing the formation of laws, 
regulations, decrees and, in general, government policies.
The measurement of corruption is still far from being uncontroversial. 
Like almost all other deviant or criminal behaviours, corruption is supposed 
to remain a secret shared by those who corrupt and those who are corrupted. 
Whistle-blowing by harmed third parties or by well-intentioned politicians, public 
officers, citizens or the media is not an entirely reliable source of data because 
it depends strongly on who has something to gain from the whistle-blowing. 
Detections made by supervising or auditing services or agencies are a more 
reliable data source provided they are relatively free from corruption – but they 
are also a less extensive data source. The same can be said about cases reported to 
and registered by judicial and law enforcement agencies. Finally, cases reaching a 
law court and ending in a conviction could indeed be considered the most reliable 
data source if they were not so dependent on why and by whom the case was 
initially detected and reported – not to mention the power or status of who was 
under investigation, and possible corruption behaviours in the courts themselves 
(Golden & Picci, 2005; Heywood & Rose, 2014).
Measuring corruption through subjective perceptions of the prevalence 
of corruption behaviours or schemes is an alternative method. The idea that 
corruption within an entire country can be accurately quantified, and compared 
and ranked, to facilitate cross-country comparisons emerged in the 1990s. The 
Corruption Perceptions Index, sponsored by the non-governmental organisation 
Transparency International (TI) started measuring corruption in countries around 
the world as perceived by experts and business people (Lambsdorff, 2006). This 
Index does not assess the true prevalence of corruption but only the level at which 
corruption is perceived by, for example, business people and people working for 
multinational companies and institutions. Although the index does not reflect the 
complex social, political, economic and cultural realities that underlie corruption, 
it nevertheless allows for a different view on corruption. The Index tends to 
measure different things from country to country and often lacks rigour or is 
misused (Thomas, 2010) but certainly is an alternative measure of corruption.
Such an alternative is important because official data tend to reflect mostly 
‘low-level’ corruption, typically involving individual actors who rarely operate 
in collusion with others, while international perceptions tend to also reflect 
‘institutional’ corruption, which operates at higher levels and entails networks 
that can have a decisive influence on the running of public services, as well as on 
institutional and legislative designs and frameworks (Lessig, 2014; Pardo, 2004).
Determining how corruption risk management plans have contributed to 
the greater prevention and detection of corruption in Portugal was the main 
aim of this study. It was assumed that an increased prevention capacity would 
be reflected in international perceptions of corruption (Corruption Perceptions 
Index), and that an enhanced early detection capacity would be reflected in the 
number of registered corruption cases and number of convictions for corruption.
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5 SOME INDICATORS AND TRENDS CONCERNING CORRUPTION IN 
PORTUGAL
International perceptions of corruption in Portugal grew with the 2008 crisis and 
clearly regressed after 2009. This trend is interesting because corruption risk 
management plans started being implemented in 2010 and, by the end of 2013, 
were active in more than two-thirds of Portuguese public institutions, services 
and corporations (Figure 1).
However, the ‘recovery’ of international perceptions started before a 
significant number of plans were implemented. Data on the year of implementation 
are not available, but a qualitative report prepared in 2014 by the Council for the 
Prevention of Corruption mentioned the steady but also slow implementation 
process. This means that other factors and other anti-corruption policies must 
have been instrumental for the international perceptions that corruption was 
again diminishing in Portugal. On the other side, international perceptions of 
corruption increased on average in the European Union member states with 
the 2008 crisis, and declined afterwards, including in Portugal. A contamination 
effect therefore cannot be discounted since the 2008 crisis was accompanied by 
widespread suspicions about the role played by politicians and senior public 
servants before and during the crisis, in particular in member states that, like 
Portugal, went bankrupt. The 2009–2014 recovery can thus simply be attributed to 
this social phenomenon.
The only evidence supporting the plans’ preventive impact is that Portugal 
‘recovered’ after the 2008 crisis at a much faster and steadier pace than the average 
EU member state. By 2014, Portugal was scoring as highly in Transparency 
International’s Corruption Index  as it did in 2001. The problem here  is that 
such ‘recovery’ can also be attributed to the wide range of the factors mentioned 
previously that were activated after 2009 – namely, the extensive anti-corruption 
legislative packages approved in 2010 and 2013; the closer monitoring by officials 
from institutions financially assisting the Portuguese government since 2011; or 
the sharp drops in public investment and intermediate consumption of goods and 
services, as well as in private investment, that followed the 2008 crisis, with an 
unknown impact by way of fewer corruption schemes or opportunities.
The data on corruption cases recorded  by Portuguese judicial and law 
enforcement agencies and on individuals convicted for corruption also do not 
Figure 1: 
Transparency 
International’s 
Corruption 
Index (inverted 
scores: 0 – high 
corruption; 10 – 
low corruption) 
(Source: 
Transparency 
International’s 
Corruption 
Perceptions 
Index, 
2001–2014)
The Genesis and Impact of Anti-corruption Policies in Portugal
171
give any evidence supporting the corruption risk management plans’ positive 
impact on prevention or early detection capacity. The decline in the number of 
recorded corruption cases started before the plans were implemented and 
increases happened in 2011 and after 2012 (Figure 2).
The number of corruption cases recorded after 2012 contradict a prevention 
effect but indicate a better detection capacity. The extent to which the increase 
can be attributed to the plans or the other mentioned anti-corruption measures is 
unfortunately something that still cannot be objectively assessed. 
The plans’ non-significant impact becomes clearer when the figures on 
convictions for corruption are considered. They show a regular pattern of ups 
and downs that persisted until 2013. The figures for 2014 were unavailable at 
the time this paper was being prepared but, if they ranged between 60 and 80 
convictions, the only possible conclusion would be that the plans simply did not 
have a significant impact on the trend of convictions.
6 CONCLUSION
The available evidence suggests that, at least until 2014, the corruption risk 
management plans had no evident impact on the prevention, detection, 
persecution and proceedings of corruption. However, regarding this type of 
anti-corruption measure, it must be remembered that by the end of 2014 the plans 
were still not implemented in all Portuguese public institutions and services, 
nor in all publicly-owned or controlled corporations; and that an incomplete 
diagnosis of the existing corruption risk and the lack of effective implementation 
of internal anti-corruption measures were regularly mentioned weaknesses in 
official reports.
The following years will certainly shed more light on the impact of this type 
of anti-corruption measure, even considering that an objective assessment will 
remain difficult. Portugal is still implementing a comprehensive anti-corruption 
national strategy and this will clearly mean the activation of factors like, 
for example, more practical measures to assure effective transparency and 
accountability of governance and the more effective protection of whistle-blowers. 
As ever more anti-corruption measures are introduced to counteract the peculiar 
Figure 2: 
Corruption 
cases recorded  
by judicial 
and law 
enforcement 
agencies, and 
individuals 
convicted for 
corruption 
(Source: 
Portuguese 
Justice 
Statistics 
Database, 
2001–2014)
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historical heritage of the Portuguese autocratic regime, Portugal will certainly 
reduce the gap existing with the majority of more socially and economically 
advanced European Union member states. The ways in which the corruption 
risk management plans will contribute to this process clearly need to be further 
assessed.
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